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Abstract:  
Some think that partiality is normative requirement of faith. Katherine Dormandy disagrees, 
arguing that partiality runs afoul of epistemic norms that faith requires. We offer an account of 
how one can respect the partiality requirement while respecting the epistemic norms as well. 
Central to the account is the role that confrontation plays in negotiating faith relationships in the 
face of damning evidence about the object of faith. We claim that in confrontation one satisfies 
the seemingly competing norms for faith. 
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1. Introduction 
What norms for belief are entailed by faith? One natural thought is that faith demands partiality. 
That is, it is a normative requirement on faith that one form positive beliefs about the object of 
faith. For example, faith in a lover might require believing that they are trustworthy, faith in a 
political cause might demand believing it is just, and faith in God might oblige us to believe that 
God is good. Katherine Dormandy [2020] disagrees. She argues that partiality norms run afoul of 
noetic entrenchment, viz. holding positive beliefs about the object in a way that flouts evidence to 
the contrary. By contrast, she argues faith is governed by no norms over and above the standard 
evidentialist norms for belief. 
She establishes this by showing that partiality views fail to give the right responses to 
encounters with stubborn counterevidence. Either they (anti-epistemic-partiality views) recommend 
flouting the evidence altogether in order to hold on to positive beliefs about the object of faith or 
they (epistemic-partiality views) lower the epistemic standards in objectionable ways to alleviate the 
epistemic pressure imposed by the counterevidence. But one cannot have praiseworthy faith when 
one refuses to grapple with the evidence against the goodness of the faith’s object. So, partiality 
norms, far from constituting what makes for great faith, importantly stand in its way. Thus, we 
should reject any partiality norms on faith. 
We disagree. We claim that cases of praiseworthy faith involve dispositions to confront the 
object of faith when presented with stubborn counterevidence against their goodness. Recognizing 
this enables us to endorse a partiality norm while avoiding Dormandy’s worries of noetic 
entrenchment. We argue that dispositions to confront the object of faith presuppose positive beliefs 
about it, thus vindicating partiality. We further argue that confrontation best respects the epistemic 





2. Confrontation as a Normative Requirement on Faith 
Consider a lover who comes by stubborn counterevidence that her partner is cheating. Suppose 
she receives good evidence that her partner is cheating from a very reliable friend. Her friend claims 
to have seen him out with another woman with whom he was interacting in blatantly romantic ways. 
How should the lover respond to this evidence? She could simply update her belief and regard her 
partner as a cheater. This, however, seems hasty. Simply updating her belief seems to make her 
blameworthy in a certain respect. How? Because in virtue of the relationship that she has with her 
partner, her partner has the right to respond to the evidence against him. The one suspected of 
cheating may justifiably ask “Why didn’t you come talk to me about it? Don’t I deserve a chance to 
clear things up?” Cases like these suggest that there is an interpersonal normative dimension to faith; 
that the object of faith be held to account for what threatens the relationship of faith.  And failure to 
confront the object of faith in light of stubborn counterevidence insufficiently respects this second-
personal feature of faith. 
Some western religious traditions give us reason to think that this generalizes to the case of 
divine-human relationships as well. When one encounters evidence against the goodness of God 
(perhaps when witnessing or undergoing some horrific suffering) there is reason to believe that one 
ought to confront God with this evidence and ask for an explanation. Using one of Dormandy’s 
examples, consider the biblical figure Job. As the story goes, God permits Job to suffer profoundly. 
Not only does he suffer the tragic loss of family, but he suffers near complete economic ruin and is 
afflicted with loathsome sores all over his body. After learning of Job’s misfortune, Job’s friends try 
to give justifying reasons for why God has allowed Job to suffer so. Perhaps God is punishing Job 
for his sins,1 or perhaps Job is being tested for some greater divine reward.2 If true, either of these 
explanations would help reconcile Job’s stubborn counterevidence. If Job deserved to suffer on 
account of sin, then God is just and there is no threat to God’s goodness. After all, aren’t we all 
sinners? If Job is being prepared to receive some greater divine reward, then God is still good. Who 
can fault God for making Job’s life ultimately much better than it presently is?  
Updating on either of these two explanations would enable Job to undercut the epistemic force 
of his stubborn evidence against God’s goodness. But instead Job rejects the epistemic outs offered 
by his peers. Yet he doesn’t give up his faith. Rather, he prays, confronting God, and demands an 
explanation: “Why do You hide Your face, And regard me as Your enemy?”3 Later, Job’s friends 
who had condemned him for what they took to be his faithless confrontational attitude toward God 
are divinely reprimanded: “My wrath is aroused against you and your two friends, for you have not 
spoken of Me what is right, as My servant Job has”4 The suggestion here is that God found Job 
faithful because Job confronted God.5  
 
1 Job 22: 4–5  
2 Ibid 22: 21–30  
3 Ibid 13:24 
4 Ibid 42:7. 
5 There is a worry here about how this works for faith in God in general. Afterall, most of us aren’t having direct 
conversations with God. The answer here will turn on the conventions governing the divine-human relationship as set 
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Confrontation is central to our understanding of the partialist position. The loving partner 
shouldn’t immediately discard her positive beliefs when presented with stubborn counterevidence 
any more than she should ignore the stubborn counterevidence. She should respond to the new 
counterevidence by confronting her partner. Likewise, the faithful believer shouldn’t immediately 
attempt resolve the epistemic pressure introduced by stubborn counterevidence by making excuses 
for why God permitted them to undergo a certain kind of horrific suffering.  She should respond to 
the new counterevidence by confronting God. This suggests that confrontation in the face of 
stubborn counterevidence is a normative requirement on faith. Call this the confrontational norm. 
In the next section we develop an account of the nature of this sort of confrontation. However, 
before going on, it is worth pointing out that a confrontation norm, while plausible for faith, fails to 
hold in the case of mere belief. Suppose that, never having been to the local government office, I 
falsely believe that it is an efficiently run government department that promptly and enthusiastically 
assists the public’s relevant need. Now suppose that a reliable friend gives me testimonial evidence 
to the contrary. The organization is terribly inefficient, she says, and customer service is poor. I am 
not blameworthy in any respect for not marching down to the office and confronting them about 
my friend’s testimony. In fact, if anyone did this, we would regard them as deeply mistaken. When 
their number is called and they begin demanding an epistemic accounting of the government 
employee sitting across the desk, we might very well imagine the employee justified in dismissing 
them with an abrupt “Next!” This is because in the case of mere beliefs, there is no relationship of 
the relevant sort that grounds interpersonal accountability norms. I can simply exchange my positive 
beliefs about the bureaucratic office for negative ones. This brings out the fact that faith is 
normatively richer than mere belief.  
3.  Confrontation, Evidential Norms, and Partiality 
 Let us now turn our attention back to the case of a lover who comes by stubborn 
counterevidence that her partner is cheating. With the testimony of her reliable friend in hand, that 
her partner is a cheater becomes a very live epistemic possibility. When such an epistemic possibility 
is opened, she may reason, “perhaps my friend only saw someone who looked like him. He has 
never given me reason in the past to think that he would be unfaithful. It would be out of character 
for him to act this way.” In such a case we have exactly the kind of conflict that Dormandy 
describes. On the one hand, there is incriminating impartial evidence that her partner is a cheater. 
On the other hand, there is relationship-internal partial evidence that he is not. Moreover, the 
impartial evidence is stubborn, not easily dealt with. She initiates an epistemic confrontation. 
 Why initiate a confrontation? She wants to know whether he is a cheater. Thus, a chief aim of 
the confrontation is to settle what is true. As such, confrontations of this sort impose an epistemic 
demand on the confrontation: that all the evidence be weighed appropriately. Failing to 
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appropriately weight the evidence undermines the lover’s ability to obtain knowledge. Now there are 
a couple of ways confrontations of this sort might go, but they share a basic structure. At some 
point (most often at the opening stages of the confrontation) the problematic evidence is presented 
to the object of faith and an explanation is demanded. Then the one confronted gives a response. 
When things go right, the confronted party gives new evidence that sheds light on what the 
confronter ought to all-things-considered believe. For example, the lover’s partner may produce an 
alibi. Perhaps he can show that the location tracking services on his phone places him in a location 
distinct from the venue her friend purportedly saw him at. Or perhaps he can’t. Maybe he really did 
it, and he confesses. He then produces additional reliable testimony that diminishes the force of the 
partialist evidence the lover has. Either way it settles the way in which the evidence ought to be 
appropriately weighted.  
Unfortunately, things often go wrong. On one such way, the confronted party may attempt to 
inappropriately leverage the confronter’s partialist evidence to distract focus from the weight of the 
incriminating impartial evidence. To see this more clearly, imagine a priest being confronted by his 
congregations after accusations of abuse have surfaced. The congregation hopes to learn by 
confrontation whether their priest has committed the abuse. It would be inappropriate for the priest 
to respond to the accusations by saying things like: “C’mon, you know me. Think about all the good 
I’ve done for this congregation; do you really think I would be capable of such a thing? Who are you 
going to believe? A man of the cloth or some kid?” What is inappropriate about responses of this 
sort is that they are evasive. The priest makes no attempt to square the counterevidence with the 
congregation’s evidence that he is no abuser. In the background of his response seems to be an 
attempt to salvage the relationship of faith by means of a subtle lowering of epistemic standards—
the impartial evidence can simply be set aside in the face of all the partial evidence. In sum, he 
attempts to manipulate the congregation to weight their evidence in his favor without offering new 
reasons to do so.  This conflicts with the high epistemic standards constitutive of the confrontation.6  
Because epistemic confrontations of this sort demand that the relevant evidence be given 
appropriate weight, we avoid the worries that Dormandy raises for partiality views of faith. 
Dormandy’s main concern is that partiality views of faith run afoul of noetic entrenchment. This 
occurs when one holds positive beliefs about the object in a way that flouts evidence to the contrary. 
Dormandy thinks this occurs in one of two ways: either by considering the counterevidence in the 
course of managing one’s beliefs, but not giving it the appropriate epistemic weight, or by altogether 
 
6 The priest case also brings out the affect that power disparities have on relationships of faith. The confrontation 
may also go wrong when the party in power uses that power to subordinate or silence their confronter. But this doesn’t 
save the relationship of faith. If anything, it trades faith for some kind of pernicious counterfeit. What’s doubly 
significant then about the confrontation between God and Job is that God does neither of these. And what starker 
power difference could there be! But suppose, unlike God, the priest doesn’t care. A distinctive feature of our 
conception of faith is that the confrontation requirement can open the faith holder to distinctive kinds of additional 
harms (subordination and silencing), in much the same way a lover can be doubly harmed by confronting an insensitive 




ignoring the counterevidence when deciding how to manage one’s beliefs. According to Dormandy 
when one’s positive beliefs about the object of faith come into question, anti-epistemic partiality 
views advocate for non-rational resolutions to the conflict. For example, they might advocate 
making a Kierkegaardian leap of faith or doggedly holding to the positive beliefs despite the 
stubborn counterevidence.7 Not so on our view. Faith driven confrontations seek a rational 
resolution to the epistemic tension generated by the stubborn counterevidence. Ultimately the 
positive beliefs must be squared with rather than be held while disregarding the counterevidence. 
Moreover, because confrontation demands that the relevant evidence be given its due, it avoids the 
problems Dormandy attributes to the epistemic-partiality view.8 Our confrontational account then 
vindicates the role that Dormandy carves out for traditional evidentialist norms and does not run 
afoul of noetic entrenchment.  
All that remains now is to show how our account vindicates partiality. We have already argued 
that praiseworthy faith involves dispositions to confront the object of faith. Absent these 
dispositions one’s faith fails to be as it ought. These dispositions, we argue, presuppose certain 
positive beliefs about the object of faith. Absent these positive beliefs, the disposition to confront 
will diminish. So, without some positive beliefs, we have no dispositions to confront. Without 
dispositions to confront our faith will fail to be as it ought. Thus, without some positive beliefs our 
faith will fail to be as it ought.  
What positive beliefs are presupposed by our dispositions to confront the objects of our faith? 
When the lover confronts her partner, when the congregation confronts their priest, when Job 
confronts God, all take the other party in the faith relationship to be cooperative participants in a 
confrontation. That is, someone with whom they can communicate openly and honestly. Moreover, 
they take there to be some relationship of mutual trust and respect. That these positive beliefs are 
presupposed by those with a deposition to confront nicely explains the effect that certain responses 
to being confronted have on the relationship of faith. Take again the case of the evasive priest. 
When he sidesteps the demand to respond directly to the evidence presented against his goodness, 
it’s guilt implicating in a faith eroding way. Why? Because it shows that he fails to have the qualities 
that the disposition to confrontation presupposes that he would have. It reveals a certain 
uncooperativeness on his part. It shows that he may not be willing to be appropriately forthright, or 
that he does not have the kind of respect his congregation took him to have for them.  
Contrast this with the case of the lover’s partner. Suppose that he responds to the 
counterevidence by confessing to the affair. This, like the previous case, is guilt implicating and faith 
eroding, but not to the same extent. His lover may very well take his confession as grounds for the 
rehabilitation of the relationship of faith. This seems well explained by the fact that confessing to the 
affair vindicates the positive presuppositions that disposed her to confront him in the first place. 
There is some level of mutual respect and willingness to be cooperative that remains.  
 
7 See e.g., Keller [2004]; Stroud [2006]; Hazlett [2013]; Kierkegaard [2009/1846].  
8 Dormandy cites as examples: Hawley [2014]; Alston [1991]; Plantinga [2000]. 
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In summary, in the face of stubborn counter evidence to the goodness of the object of faith, 
those with praiseworthy faith will confront the object of faith. Such a confrontation consists in a 
demand for a rational resolution producing high confidence in whether the object of faith is still 
worth having faith in. The upshot of this observation is three-fold. First, because praiseworthy faith 
seeks confrontation, ultimately the positive beliefs must be squared with rather than flout the 
evidence. Thus, it avoids the problems Dormandy attributes to the anti-epistemic-partiality view. 
Second, because confrontation demands the relevant evidence be given its due, it avoids the 
problems Dormandy attributes to the epistemic-partiality view. Third, we vindicate partiality: 
confrontation presupposes that the relevant parties can communicate openly, will be truthful, and 
have mutual respect. Absent these positive beliefs, the disposition to confront will diminish. And 
since praiseworthy faith involves dispositions to confront, the praiseworthiness of the faith will 
likewise diminish. We can now see that one really can be both a partialist and an evidentialist about 
faith.   
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